Abstract. In this article we present a technique for selecting models of set theory that are complete in a model-theoretic sense. Specifically, we will apply Robinson infinite forcing to the collections of models of ZFC obtained by Cohen forcing. This technique will be used to suggest a unified perspective on generic absoluteness principles.
Introduction
Soon after the invention of forcing, in 1963, the abundance of independence results started to undermine the hope for a unified picture of the universe of all sets. An exemplar reaction is the formalist perspective taken by Cohen himself in the more philosophical interpretation of his celebrated result on the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis.
So, let me say that I will ascribe to Skolem a view, not explicitly stated by him, that there is a reality to mathematics, but axioms cannot describe it. Indeed one goes further and says that there is no reason to think that any axiom system can adequately describe it. But forcing, by itself, does not disprove a realist perspective on truth in set theory. On the contrary, the deep understanding and refinement of the method helped the search for forcing invariant theories [18] , [17] , with the goal to isolate the right axiomatic extensions of ZFC.
The question whether forcing suggests to abandon or allows to strengthen our search for a unified picture does not have a clear answer. Moreover, even on the side of a realist interpretation of mathematical reality, the debate on competing extensions of ZFC shows that choosing the right criteria to overcome independence is a complex task, where not only mathematical considerations need to be taken into account [1] , [14] , [16] , [19] .
We propose here to accept a generic perspective on mathematical truth, without nevertheless embracing positionà la Balaguer-Hamkins [8] , [3] , akin to a kind of formalism. Indeed, the starting point of this work consists in accepting independence as an essential limitation of our axiomatic method. This means that, in order to complete ZFC, we should not only try to extend the axioms of set theroy, but we also need semantic considerations for the selection of the right models. But on which ground should we choose?
Tools for the semantic completion of mathematical theories have been largely studied in model theory. We propose here to apply a technique that has proven to be successful in other fields: Robinson infinite forcing. This method originates from the study of model complete theories and generalizes the notion of algebraically closed field to the algebraic study of other classes of structures. Differently from Cohen's forcing, Robinson's infinite forcing does not build new models but it selects the generic ones out of a given class of structures.
In this paper we investigate the possibility to apply Robinson infinite forcing to the so-called generic multiverse: the collection of ZFC models obtained by Cohen forcing. This will allow us to use algebraic considerations for the selection of the relevant generic models of set theory. Interestingly, these generic models will show a high degree of genericity, offering a unified picture of generic absoluteness principles like Bounded Forcing Axioms, Resurrection Axioms, and Maximality Principles. If any, the importance of this perspective is given by the unified picture it offers.
The paper is structured as follows: in §1.1 we briefly present the general theory of Robinson infinite forcing, that we apply, in §1.2, to the generic multiverse of ZFC. Finally, in §1.3, we offer two concrete examples of generic models of set theory. We conclude, in §2, with plans for future work.
Robinson infinite forcing of Cohen generic multiverse
The basic structure we study in this paper is the collection of generic extensions of a countable transitive model M; c.t.m. henceforth. Definition 1.1. Given a c.t.m. M of ZFC and a class of forcings Γ, defined by a first order formula ϕ Γ in the language of set theory, we let M Γ M be the collection of all generic extensions of M by elements of Γ M , i.e., the extension of the relativization of ϕ Γ to M. Moreover for N, We can now define the two main mutliverses we will study in §1.3. 2 is not set theory, but algebra. In particular, Robinson was interested in finding analogs of algebraically closed fields within other classes of structures. To this aim Robinson introduced minimal conditions which must be satisfied in order for a structure to have "algebraically closed" extensions.
Robinson defined two distinct model-theoretic notions of forcing, namely, infinite and finite forcing. The latter resembles more closely Cohen's forcing and it will not be discussed in this work. On the other hand, infinite forcing characterizes a concept that is closely related to the notion of existential completeness-i.e., when Σ 1 -formulas are absolute between a structure and its extensions-and of model-companionship, which is defined as follows. Definition 1.4. Given two first order theories T and T˚, expressed in the same language, we say that T˚is the model companion of T iff (a) T and T˚are mutually consistent (i.e., every model of T is embeddable in a model of T˚and vice versa) and (b) T˚is model complete (i.e., every embedding between two models of T˚is elementary).
In order to apply Robinson infinite forcing to the Cohen generic multiverse, we recall few definitions and facts. As usual we consider other connectives like @ and Ñ as abbreviations.
Remark 1.6. In Definition 1.5 we are implicitly assuming the existence of an appropriate interpretation, in M, of the language in which a formula ϕ is expressed. For the sake of simplicity we will continue to avoid this level of details, since it is not relevant for the arguments of this paper.
Definition 1.7. We say that a structure M is infinitely generic whenever, for any formula ϕ, it is the case that
Infinitely generic structures are those in which forcability and satisfiability coincide.
Under specific conditions, infinitely generic structures always exist. Theorem 1.9. ( [11] , Proposition 3.2) If a class of structures Σ is inductive (i.e. the union of structures in Σ results in a structure in Σ), then any structure in Σ can be extended to an infinitely generic structure in Σ.
Modified Robinson's forcing.
We can now state the relevant property that we need to impose on the multiverse in order to apply Robinson infinite forcing. We need to select a Γ such that M Γ M is σ-closed. Even though the elements of M Γ M are not closed under arbitrary unions, σ-closeness will provide enough directness for Robinson infinite forcing construction to go through. Towards this end we can define the relevant modification of Robinson infinite forcing; the only difference is that we consider generic extensions instead of Ď-extensions. As in Definition 1.5, other connectives like @ and Ñ are treated as abbreviations.
Remark 1.11. For notational convenience we will drop the subscript M from the ( M -relation, since we are not interested here in specific multiverses. Therefore we will refer to Definition 1.10 as the infinite multiverse forcing and not as the infinite M-multiverse forcing. However it should be kept in mind that the definition of the infinite multiverse forcing may not be absolute 3 .
The following facts are easy consequences of the definition of the infinitely generic forcing and show similarities of this notion both with Cohen forcing and with the satisfaction relation. Structures that are infinitely generic in the multiverse not only exist, but are dense in the partial order induced by the relation of generic extendability. On the lack of absoluteness of Robinson's infinite forcing see [15] . While Cohen forcing produces models that can differ substantially between each others, Robinson's forcing produces models that display a very stable theory. Proposition 1.17. If N is a structure that is infinitely generic in the multiverse and N 1 is a second structure that is infinitely generic in the multiverse and such that
, N is an elementary substructure of N 1 .
Proof. Let ϕ be a sentence with parameters in N. If N |ù ϕ, then N ( ϕ. So N 1 ( ϕ and therefore N 1 |ù ϕ. On the other hand if N 1 |ù ϕ, then N 1 ( ϕ. Now, since N ( ϕ would contradict that N 1 ( ϕ, then, due to the genericity of N, we have that N ( ϕ. This is enough since we get that N |ù ϕ. Proposition 1.17 is the key ingredient to show the high level of absoluteness displayed by the structures that are infinitely generic in the multiverse. In order to make the above statement more precise we need a couple of definitions that are adaptations of analogous notions from model theory. 
We are now ready to state an important property of the structures that are infinitely generic in the multiverse. Proposition 1.19. Every structure that is infinitely generic in the multiverse is existentially complete in M Γ M . Proof. Let N be a structure that is infinitely generic in the multiverse and let ϕ be a Σ 1 -sentence with parameters in N and true in some N 1 such that As the rest of the section will show, infinitely generic structures in M Γ M display a very strong level of generic absoluteness with respect to generic extensions by posets in Γ. In [2] , Bounded Forcing Axioms have been characterized in terms of generic absoluteness, showing that BF Apκ, Γq is equivalent to say that, for all P P Γ, Proof. Let ϕ " @x 1 , . . . , x n ψpx 1 , . . . , x n q, with ψ being Σ 1 . Let a 1 , . . . a n be arbitrary but fixed elements of N. Then, since N 1 ď M Γ M N, we have that N Ď N 1 and therefore that ϕ can be seen as having parameters in N 1 also. Since ϕ holds in N 1 , we have that ψpa 1 , . . . , a n q also holds in N 1 . Being N existentially complete in N 1 and ψ being Σ 1 , we get that N |ù ψpa 1 , . . . , a n q. By arbitrariness of the choice of a 1 , . . . a n we have that N |ù @x 1 , . . . , x n ψpx 1 , . . . , x n q must be the case. Hence ϕ holds in N. 
Proposition 1.24. Every structure that is infinitely generic in the multiverse is
Besides these closure properties, infinitely generic structures capture an even more fundamental aspect of generic absoluteness: the possibility that a formula is persistent across the generic multiverse. Proof. We know that N 1 |ù ϕ. Now extend N 1 to an N 2 that is infinitely generic in the multiverse. By hypothesis N 2 |ù ϕ, but now, by Proposition 1.17, we get that N |ù ϕ.
Notice that, in modal terms, Theorem 1.25 implies that an infinitely generic structure in the multiverse verifies the modal principle ♦lϕ Ñ ϕ, where lϕ is defined as "ϕ holds in all generic extensions by forcing in Γ".
Interestingly enough this principle has been studied both in the context of the modal logic of forcing and in the context of generic absoluteness principles. In the former case has been named Maximality Principle [7] , while in the latter case represents a weak form of Resurrection Axiom [10] . Indeed, ♦lϕ Ñ ϕ is modally equivalent to ϕ Ñ l♦ϕ, which in turns expresses the fact that if a formula ϕ is valid in a model M, then, whatever is the generic extension of M we consider, it is possible to further extend it to a new model where ϕ holds.
Hamkins' Resurrection Axiom is actually stronger, being in the form of an equivalence. Definition 1.26. (Hamkins, [10] ) The Resurrection Axiom RA(Γ) asserts that for every forcing Q P Γ, there is a Q-name 9 R with 1 Q , 9 R P Γ and such that
Using Theorem 1.25 we get the following corollary.
Notice that Theorem 1.25 allows for a stronger version of the above corollary; one that avoids the restriction of the parameters to H 2 ℵ 0 . In other words, with the terminology of [7] , we have that an infinitely generic structure in M Γ M models the boldface version of the Maximality Principle restricted to forcings in Γ.
The question, then, is whether there are multiverses such that the properties of Γ allow to show that M Γ M is σ-closed. Next section will provide such examples. Proof. The idea of the construction consists of making finitely many changes to each real c n , resulting in a real d n , in such a way that the resulting combined real d is M-generic for the forcing Addpω, ωq. To do this we construct d as a binary function d : ωˆω Ñ 2, where the nth slice will correspond to a real d n : ω Ñ 2.
To this aim, fix an enumeration xD n : n P ωy of all open dense sets of Addpω, ωq in M. We construct d in stages, by defining a sequences xd n : n P ωy of reals and another auxiliary sequence xp n : n P ωy of finite conditions in Addpω, ωq that will guarantee the genericity of d. Suppose we are at stage n and we have completely specified d k , for k ă n, and we are also committed to a finite condition p n´1 P Addpω, ωq such that p n´1 aen Ď d 0ˆ. . .ˆd n´1 . We now want to get into the dense set D n . By inductive hypothesis d 0ˆ. . .ˆd n´1 is an M-generic real, since each d k is a finite modification of the corresponding c k which are mutually Mgeneric. Now, choose a Cohen real e that is Mrd 0ˆ. . .ˆd n´1 s-generic for Addpω, ωq and such that p n´1 Ď d 0ˆ. . .ˆd n´1ˆe ; this is possible since compatibility with p n´1 amounts in finite modifications that preserve genericity. Notice that d 0ˆ. . .ˆd n´1ˆe is M-generic for Addpω, ωq. Consequently there is a finite p Ď d 0ˆ. . .ˆd n´1ˆe in D n . Since both p and p n´1 are included in d 0ˆ. . .ˆd n´1ˆe we have that p Y p n´1 is a condition that, since D n is open, is in D n . Call this union p n . We then finitely modify c n to a new condition d n , so to be compatible with p n ; hence p n aepn`1q Ď d 0ˆ. . .ˆd n . Therefore, defining d " Ś nPω d n , we will have that d will eventually contain all conditions p n and so will be M-generic for Addpω, ωq. Indeed every p n is finite and at each step of our construction we build d in order to include more and more initial coordinates of a given p n . Moreover, c n P Mrds, since each c n is a finite modification of d n . Hence Mrc 0 src 1 s . . . rc n s Ď Mrds.
Since the product of countably many copies of Addpω, 1q is isomorphic to Addpω, 1q, we get the following corollary. . This is because in countably many steps we can reach the hight of the model and thus we risk to collapse everything to countable or to violate the powerset axiom. Next theorem shows that to avoid these phenomena it is sufficient to put a bound on the posets allowed. [6] shows that when the G n 's are mutually generic, it is possible to build a generic extension witnessing the closure of the chain by a filter G that is also generic with respect to each G n .
Notice that Theorem 1.31 is optimal, because of the following result. (1) The chain is bounded above by a forcing extension MrHs, by some forcing notion Q P M and an M-generic filter H Ď Q. (2) Letting κ n be the smallest size, in M, of the Boolean completion of a forcing notions P n , for which there is an M-generic filter H n Ď P n such that MrG n s " MrH n s, we have that suptκ n : n P ωu P M. If the cardinalites of the Q n 's in M are bounded in M, then there is a set-forcing extension MrGs with MrG n s Ď MrGs, for all n ă ω. More in general, defining BFApΓ κ q to be the weakening of BFApκ, Γq where a poset in Γ is assumed to have cardinality ď κ, the following question naturally arises: Question 2 : Can Robinson's infinite forcing give a consistency proof of the corresponding BFApΓ κ q?
Concluding remarks
In this paper we showed an interesting connection between generic absoluteness and Robinson infinite forcing. One could think that the reason is the close connection between Cohen's and Robinson's techniques. However, the possibility to recast Robinson's infinite forcing by means of model theoretic constructions that do not involve forcing suggests otherwise. Indeed, Cherlin showed [4] that infinitely generic structures can be approximated by chains of models 6 that inductively capture larger and larger classes of persistent sentences, without introducing any notion coming form the theory of forcing. If Cohen's and Robinson's techniques are fairly different from a theoretical perspective, however the results of this paper suggest that the strategy for overcoming independence in set theory-i.e. generic absoluteness results-can be seen as a particular case of a model theoretic technique applied to the multiverse. In a slogan, Robinson's ideas offer a revenge against Cohen's independence results.
Therefore, the extent and the nature of the link between generic absoluteness and infinite forcing remains a promising question that still requires a complete answer. We started here by scratching the surface of an interesting interplay between set theory and model theory.
The obvious extension of the results of this paper concerns the possibility to overcome the limits imposed by the height of the models of a generic multiverse-which, by Cohen's method, is always the same of the ground model. Indeed, we might modify the definition of M Γ M so that at each step the hight of the models increases. An obvious attempt could use generic ultrapowers; in that case it would be interesting to understand the connection between this kind of multiverse and Woodin's P max . We leave this task for future work.
